Introduction

Debate over intelligent design, like virtually any debate in philosophy, rarely occurs in a philosophical vacuum. Participants will come with commitments about what counts as a bona fide scientific or philosophical hypothesis, the nature of intelligence and intentional explanations, a conception of what is natural and what is physical. A case for ID on a cosmic scale can be handicapped if we narrow acceptable explanations to laws of nature that shun intentional and other teleological explanations, deeming them to have only pragmatic significance. A case for ID does not have a prayer in a debate if theistic explanations are considered at the start irremediably occult, nonnatural phenomena.

There are three sections in this essay. First, I propose that participants in debating ID take seriously the revival of substance dualism. This amounts to urging ID debaters to take into account the state of play in philosophy of mind. Second, I make note of the importance of the magnitude and consistency of cosmic hypotheses under debate. So, this section urges attention be given to the philosophy of religion as well as philosophy of mind literature. A third section addresses the important role that a Platonic metaphysic can make to debating ID. Of course, a vigorous case for ID can be made without substance dualism, some of the philosophy of religion literature or Platonism. Indeed, because of a significant aversion to taking on more controversial matters than necessary, some philosophers will see substance dualism, philosophy of religion, and Platonism as a few albatrosses, unwelcome burdens rather than assets. The aim of this essay is to challenge such inhospitality. At the risk of offending those who find metaphors and literature exasperating: if a person is inclined to classify these philosophies as albatrosses, the albatross is in reality a wondrous bird, and only a burden if a person, following Coleridge’s eighteenth-century ancient mariner, kill it and hang it around the neck. Shedding any further philosophical ornithology, this essay is aimed at philosophers in the ID literature who assume that substance dualism, some issues in philosophy of religion, and Platonism are dead.

Taking Substance Dualism Seriously

According to a standard version of substance dualism in philosophy of mind, persons are understood to be substantial subjects enduring over time who are embodied but not the same thing as (or metaphysically identical with) their bodies. Most substance dualists hold that persons and bodies are profoundly united under natural, healthy conditions, but embodiment can be broken asunder in cases of grave physical or mental damage or, inevitably, at biological death. Most dualists, historically and today, advocate what seems evident in our experience and our mental lives (our thinking, feeling, beliefs, intentions and so on) impact our bodily life and the functioning of our bodies impact our mental life. Some version of substance dualism can be traced back to Plato, Augustine, Descartes, and the Cambridge Platonists, to its contemporary advocates such as Richard Swinburne and Joshua Farris. Substance dualism is routinely dismissed by many contemporary philosophers, and even a high percentage of Christian theologians.

The chief philosophical objections to substance dualism include the following:

• The contention that a bifurcation of person (mind or soul) and body is counter to common sense, ordinary language, and experience; it leaves unexplained how it might be that something non-physical can interact with what is physical.
• Interaction between the physical and non-physical violates the principle of the conservation of energy; the very idea that there is or could be a non-physical soul (or mind or person) is incoherent.
• It has been refuted by what is known as “the private language argument.”
• Simplicity in hypotheses is an asset and some form of physicalism is more simple than substance dualism.

A listing of the objections is not newsworthy, but what is less well known is that each of these objections (and more) have been addressed and, in my view, overturned by a host of philosophers over the past thirty years. These philosophers include C. Stephen Evans, Joshua Farris, John Foster, Stewart Goetz, W. D. Hart, William Hasker, E. J. Lowe, H. D. Lewis, David Lund, J. P. Moreland, Alvin Plantinga, Brandon Rickabaugh, Howard Robinson, Richard Swinburne, Charles Taliaferro, Keith Ward, Dallas Willard, Dean Zimmerman, among others.^[1] Many of them argue that some form of dualism is a precondition for the intelligibility of the practice of science (which involves conscious subjects engaging in observations, reasoning, testing hypotheses, and so on). This literature not only replies to objections but contains rich, positive reasons for embracing substance dualism: the knowledge argument, a unity of consciousness argument, an argument from personal identity over time, modal arguments (including famous zombie thought experiments), an argument based on the coherence of skepticism about other minds (especially used against private language arguments), and appeals to common sense, ordinary language, and experience. In my first book, I sort through many of the arguments and reply to what I believe to be misguided theological objections.^[2]

The focus here is on the relevance of substance dualism to ID debate and not all objections to substance dualism, with replies to each, and then develop the arguments for substance dualism I find compelling. Instead, please consider the (bare) possibility that substance dualism is emerging as a powerful option in philosophy of mind. What would the success of substance dualism do to the positions taken up in the ID debate?

The success of substance dualism would defeat the idea that the natural world is exclusively physical and the hypothesis that all events are ultimately describable and explainable in the natural sciences. It secures a strong foothold for recognizing the integrity of intentional explanations and designs by intentional, purposive activity. If it is accepted as fact (or philosophically plausible) that in our own case and (according to many substance dualists) in the case of some conscious, purposive nonhuman animals, we see bona fide intelligent design, it becomes harder to dismiss out of hand cosmic intelligent design.

Substance dualism does not itself entail theism. Most arguments for substance dualism now in print do not presuppose the plausibility of theism. To be sure, some philosophers argue that theism is the best explanation of persons, as understood by substance dualism (for example, Joshua Farris, Stewart Goetz, J. P. Moreland, among others),^[3] but there are substance dualists who are atheists (for example, C. J. Ducasse, Peter Unger).^[4] Moreover, it should be noted that the increased philosophical critique of reductive physicalism for denying or marginalizing consciousness has given rise to a renewal of interest in panpsychism, which argues that mental life is suffused throughout the cosmos. While many believe panpsychism is compatible with theism, this is not universal.^[5] In any case, the plausibility of substance dualism challenges some grounds for dismissing theistic intelligent design. I have argued elsewhere that substance dualism may boost the case for both theism and panpsychism.^[6] By my lights, the revival of substance dualism is good news for theism, panpsychism, and even some forms of idealism, but bad news for virtually all current forms of physicalism that fails to recognize the irreducible reality of the mental, including intelligent design.

Magnitude and Consistency

In this section, I address two objections to theistic ID, one from David Hume and, more recently, from Thomas Nagel. The first concerns the importance of appreciating the magnitude of a hypothesis under debate. On this point, I propose that one of Hume’s objections to a theistic argument from design needs to reflect a more expansive role of the mental. Ironically, my point is supported by Thomas Nagel in his fine book, Mind and Cosmos, though I will go in this section to criticize Nagel on another matter.

In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume raises many objections to a theistic design argument advanced by Cleanthes. These have been identified as the problem of dissimilitude, the uniqueness objection, the objection from alternative possibilities, the problem of anthropomorphism, and the problem of evil.^[7] What infects some of these objections (raised by Philo in the Dialogues in which most commentators see as representing Hume’s own views) is a highly dismissive view of the reality and significance of the mental (for example, the mind, thought, intentional explanations). Philo says,

Why select so minute, so weak, so bounded principle as the reason and design of animals . . . found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favor does indeed present it on all occasions: But sound philosophy ought carefully guard against so natural an illusion.^[8]

However, consider three replies. First, it is problematic to identify “thought” with a “little agitation of the brain.” Hume himself (apart from his character Philo) did not endorse an identity of thought with brain states, and even if he did, there are abundant reasons given in the literature referenced in the first section why we should not. Moreover, “agitation” is normally an occurrence, something that happens to a subject, not a positive activity, whereas thinking is preeminently a positive activity—while sometimes an idea will seem to occur to us unbidden, continued thinking about it is an activity.

Second, Philo (and/or Hume) is right that the design, thought, and reason of human and some nonhuman animals is subject to failure and biological decay and such phenomena are found indeed on our planet, but is there anything intrinsically or essentially minute, weak, bounded, or earthly about the power, scope, and durability of thought and reason per se? If there seems to be no logical or metaphysical impossibility involved, it seems unjustified to dismiss such a possibility as an illusion.

Third, the objection that theists (or at least Cleanthes) use observations about terrestrial phenomena in their cosmology, so do secular naturalists. So, while many theists look to the intentional design and find evidence around us a reflection of that great, powerful divine creator-intelligence, secular naturalists model their cosmology on what they observe to be non-intentional, purely physical explanations to form their cosmic hypotheses. And in so doing, I suggest that Thomas Nagel is right that secular naturalists have failed to offer a plausible account of a host of factors, including consciousness, values, and reason.^[9]

Fourth, the above points are not tied in any way to some kind of unphilosophical partiality or favoritism. Claiming that the mental (selves, persons, consciousness) is not identical with physical phenomena could be a humble recognition of what is the case. If it comes down to locating misplaced motives or integrity, it is conceivable that denying such a claim could be based on an unjustified partial favoritism for the natural sciences (as conceived of by ardent physicalists). 

I submit that scrutinizing Hume’s critique of a design argument should give us pause about its being awry on many grounds, not the least being the revival of antiphysicalism in philosophy of mind. Having drawn on Nagel’s work, I now offer some criticism in his reasons for not seeing theism as a live, philosophical alternative to the physicalist naturalism both he and most theists reject.

Nagel grants that theism offers what seems like an advantage over secular naturalism, but it falters because of its partiality or lack of a comprehensive metaphysic, and it invokes a reality outside the natural world. It should be noted that Nagel does not advance these points as purely a matter of impartial philosophical reasoning but based on “my ungrounded intellectual preference.”^[10] This admission is deeply admirable, but I shall take his objections to theism seriously. On the partiality of theism, Nagel writes,

A theistic account has the advantage over a reductive naturalistic one that it admits the reality of more of what is so evidently the case, and tries to explain it all. But even if theism is filled out with the doctrines of a particular religion … it offers a very partial explanation of our place in the world. It amounts to the hypothesis that the higher-order explanation of how things hang together is of a certain type, namely intentional or purposive, without having more to say about how that intention operates except found in the results to be explained.^[11]

Perhaps an analogy would be the paucity of explaining why a garden exists and has such nurturing plants is by the claim it was created and cultivated by one or more gardeners, without any further ideas about the garden-fostering agents, their motives, location, and so on.

Nagel’s second objection is that theistic explanations are “outside the world,” not subject to natural laws:

The disadvantage of theism as an answer to the desire for a comprehensive understanding [of reality or the cosmos] is not that it offers no explanation but that it does not do so in the form of a comprehensive account of the natural order. Theism pushes the quest for intelligibility outside the world. If God exists, he is not part of the natural order but a free agent not governed by natural laws. He may act partly by creating a natural order, but whatever he does directly cannot be part of that order.^[12]

As for the first objection, Nagel hints at a reply, for he notes that intentional explanations (whether in terms of human persons or God) are best construed in terms of bringing about some good. Nagel writes,

An intentional explanation must be thought of as having aims that it sees as good, so the aims cannot be arbitrary; a theistic explanation will inevitably bring in some idea of value, and a particular religion can make this much more specific, though it also poses the famous problem of evil.^[13]

I suggest that if a theistic explanation raises the traditional problem of evil, then the content of the theistic hypothesis is substantial. That is, if the form of theistic ID under debate gives reasons to expect there to be no evil at all or that the occurrence of evil (even horrendous evil) is compatible with God defeating such evil then it cannot be dismissed for lacking content.^[14]

On Nagel’s second point, while most extant philosophical and religious forms of theism do not believe that God is a circumscribable object in the world, subject to the laws of nature, most affirm that God is both transcendent as well as immanent throughout the cosmos or “the world.” Indeed, there is an enormous philosophical literature on ostensible experiences of God throughout virtually all cultures that underscore a theistic hypothesis that the experience of God is both common and natural. An aside but related point: Although I am not a keen wordsmith, I suggest to my fellow theists to not use the term “supernatural” in reference to God as that will set off alarm bells that one’s position or God is “non-natural,” whereas, if theism is true, God may be described as more natural (fitting, existing essentially) than any other natural phenomena.

A Platonic Framework

Because I may have already put readers under too much stress who are not sympathetic to substance dualism and the relevant philosophy of religion literature, I realize that invoking a Platonic metaphysic may be a bridge too far. Even so, with apologies, I offer, especially to ID defenders, a Platonic metaphysic as a useful amplification of the notion of acting intentionally to bring about something by design.

The version of Platonism I propose is the idea that there are abstract objects, states of affairs like There being people or There being unicorns that either obtain or do not obtain. States of affairs (SOAs) are not physical or spatial in any sense. On the view I commend, they are not created or destroyed, but necessarily existing non-concrete entities. Another person and I can contemplate the same SOAs; I might desire that the following SOA obtain—There being open borders between nations for immigration—while the other person is passionately working to prevent that SOAs from obtaining. Truth and falsehood may be analyzed as the obtaining or not obtaining of SOAs. To claim that it is true that dinosaurs once roamed the earth is the claim that the SOA There being dinosaurs roaming the earth once obtained.

Why think there are SOAs? I offer four reasons. First, they can be the foundation for an account of truth that does not rely on human conventions, language, or thought. Most of us believe there are truths about countless events prior to there being humans or language of any kind. An ontology of SOAs supports common-sense realism. Second, they provide an account of our intersubjectivity. As noted, we can have different intentional attitudes (for example, love, hate, belief, doubt) toward the same object; recognizing SOAs offers an account of this phenomenon. Third, they provide a framework for understanding necessary truths. To claim that the law of identity (A is A) is necessarily the case may be analyzed as the SOA Everything is self-identical obtains necessarily, and it is not obtaining is impossible. Fourth, positing SOAs offers an amplified account of intentional activity. For a person to seek food is for a person to seek some SOA (for example There being a vegan meal) to obtain.

Why object to recognizing SOAs? One is that they are not physical, but one can still be a card-carrying physicalist and recognize SOAs, so long as one claims that all concrete, non-abstract objects are physical. Physicalists can even use SOAs to articulate their views (for example, physicalists hold that the SOA There being a cosmos in which all concrete objects are physical obtains). So, physicalism can make room for SOAs. A second objection takes aim at the content of SOAs. In God and Necessity, Brian Leftow cites the following complaint,

We do not understand even the simplest … abstract objects very well … the number 4 … has logical properties like self-identity … and it has arithmetical properties … But what others? It is, no doubt, non-spatial and perhaps non-temporal. It is perhaps necessarily existent. At about this point … if we try to describe its intrinsic features, we soon trail off in puzzlement.^[15]

I suggest a different point of view: there are many extant theories about how we learn languages, mathematics, practical reasoning, and so on; I assume the objection is that we lack an account of people learning to count. In the course of learning how to count, one does not (of course) contemplate the truth of Platonism or its alternatives (nominalism, conceptualism, Aristotelianism, and so on). SOAs only come in when we philosophically investigate the grounds for the truth of mathematics. Grasping the number 4 or the property being 4 is a formal quantification distinct from written or spoken symbols we use to refer to it (numerals refer to numbers but are not the same thing as numbers). The complaint that the abstract object “the number 4” or being 4 has little content is itself puzzling. So long as someone grasps some of its arithmetical properties (the number is even, it is a successor of 3, it is the equivalent of 1+1+1+1, and so on), what else needs to be specified other than the number itself is not a physical, concrete thing or relation, but an abstract object? It would be far more baffling to claim that the number 4 is the very same thing as a sentential object (marks on a blackboard) or brain state or that it lives in London or has a particular color or odor. In fact, SOA can be used to account for the puzzlement that Leftow references: there are some philosophers who find the SOA There being abstract objects puzzling.

So, how might recognizing SOA impact ID debate? I believe that it can offer the contributions cited earlier, such as filling out an account of intentional design in terms of seeking the obtaining of one or more SOAs. While recognizing SOAs is compatible with a physicalism of concrete objects, it does show that a more comprehensive physicalism (all objects are physical) is either false or unreasonable. Along with the cogency of substance dualism, the cogency of Platonism would provide another reason for denying the causal closure of the physical: ultimately explaining why persons reason that 4 is 1+1+1+1 would rest on persons grasping necessary entailments of abstract.

Conclusion

In philosophical arguments for a specific thesis, participants often seek to make accepting the thesis as uncostly as possible. For example, in arguing for the value of a representative democracy, there is some strategic advantage if one’s argument does not require the acceptance of controversial moral theories (for example, only one version of Kant’s categorical imperative can secure the conclusion). In the case at hand, I concede that a case for ID need not rely on substance dualism, the philosophy of religion literature on the problem of evil, or Platonism. Even so, the current revival of substance dualism can provide support for a case for ID, appeal to the philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion can assist in overturning objections to ID from David Hume and Thomas Nagel. Moreover, a Platonic metaphysic can be of use in amplifying the nature of ID in terms of intending that some SOA obtains.

---

^[1] Because a full listing of references would be overwhelming here, readers are referred to three texts with excellent bibliographies demonstrating the vibrancy of substance dualism in peer-reviewed journals and established presses: Angus Menuge, Jonathan Loose, and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018); Branden Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Case for Substance Dualism (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2023); Joshua Farris, The Creation of Self: A Case for the Soul (Washington: IFF Books, 2023).

^[2] Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

^[3] See, for example, Farris, The Creation of Self; Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz, eds., The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul (London: Continuum, 2010); Brandon Rickabaugh and J. P. Moreland, The Substance of Consciousness: A Comprehensive Defense of Contemporary Substance Dualism (Hoboken, NY: Wiley-Blackwell, 2023).

^[4] See, for example, C. J. Ducasse, “In Defense of Dualism,” in Dimensions of Mind, ed. Sydney Hook (New York: Macmillan-Collier, 1961); Peter K. Unger, “Why We Really May Be Immaterial Souls,” in All the Power in the World, ed. Peter K. Unger (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

^[5] For an excellent overview of the latter, see Mikael Leidenhag, Naturalizing God? A Critical Evaluation of Religious Naturalism (Albany, NY: State Univ of New York Press, 2022).

^[6] Charles Taliaferro, “Dualism and Panpsychism,” in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. G. Buntrup and L. Jakolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 369-87.

^[7] See Charles Taliaferro, Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 4.

^[8] David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Stanley Tweymn (London: Routledge, 1991), 113.

^[9] See Thomas Nagel, Mind and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

^[10] Nagel, Mind and Consciousness, 26.

^[11] Nagel, Mind and Consciousness, 25.

^[12] Nagel, Mind and Consciousness, 25-26.

^[13] Nagel, Mind and Consciousness, 25.

^[14] As with my discussion about substance dualism, I will not offer here a long list of publications on the theistic problem of evil as evidence that theism carries robust content, but I suggest a good place for readers to start is the annotated bibliography assembled by Barry L. Whitney: Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the Problem of Evil, 1960-1990 (London: Garland, 1993). He identified 4,237 philosophical books, papers, and dissertations on the problem of evil. I believe that in the thirty years since Whitney’s extraordinary compilation, that number may have doubled.

^[15] Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 512.